A. Meca, J. A. García Martínez
Certain purchasing groups do not flourish. A supposed reason for this is a creeping dissatisfaction among various members of a group with the allocation of the cooperative costs. In this talk, we focus on cooperative purchasing cost models with general and continuos quantity discounts. Then, we compare the commonly used Equal Price (EP) method for allocating costs with a new method of Diffrent Prices (DP). We show that the EP method, although unfair in many situations, works very well when discounts are linear. However, in situations with non-linear discounts, the EP method is not acceptable to some agents (mayor agents). For these situations, we propose a family of Different Price cost allocations with different prices that are efficient and acceptable to all agents.
Palabras clave: cost games, purchasing groups, equal price, different price, cost allocations
Programado
GT02 Teoría de Juegos III. Avances recientes en Modelos de Decisión Estratégica
10 de junio de 2022 10:10
A14
