L. M. Armijos Toro, J. M. Alonso Meijide, M. A. Mosquera Rodríguez
Weighted majority games are simple games in which there is a quota and a weight for each player so that, a coalition is winning if the sum of the weights of the coalition is greater than or equal to the quota. On the other hand, a TU game with a priori unions is a TU game along with a partition of the player set representing a predefined coalition structure. In this paper we define and axiomatically characterize extensions of the Colomer-Martínez (Colomer and Martínez, 1995) and HCM (Armijos-Toro et al., 2022) power indices to the class of weighted majority games with a priori unions.
References
Colomer, J. M., Martínez, F. (1995). The paradox of coalition trading. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 7(1), 41–63.
Armijos-Toro, L.M., Alonso-Meijide, J., Mosquera, M.A. (2022). Mergeable weighted majority games and characterizations of power indices. Mimeo.
Acknowledgements: MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, MTM2017-87197-C3-3-P, ED431C 2021/24, ED431C 2020/03.
Palabras clave: Simple games, Weighted majority games, Coalition structure, Colomer-Martínez index.
Programado
GT02 Teoría de Juegos II. Teoría de juegos, comunicación y repartos
9 de junio de 2022 12:00
A14
