F. Bernstein, G. Decroix, J. C. Gonçalves Dosantos
This paper considers a project consisting of multiple activities performed by independent players. Each player has control and discretion over the time required to complete the activity it is responsible for. Devoting a standard amount of resources to that activity would result in some base amount of time for completion. However, a player may divert some resources to outside projects in order to earn additional revenue leading to inexcusable delays in the activity under the player’s control. Such delays may or may not cause delays in the overall project completion time. If an overall project delay results, the project manager incurs a penalty based on the terms of the contract established with the customer. We study the allocation of project-level penalties (arising from inexcusable delays) among project activities, and examine how this allocation impacts the players’ decision making and the associated completion time of the project.
Palabras clave: Project Management, Game Theory, Shapley Value
Programado
GT02 Teoría de Juegos II. Teoría de juegos, comunicación y repartos
9 de junio de 2022 12:00
A14
