M. Alvarez Mozos, J. M. Alonso Meijide, M. G. Fiestras Janeiro, A. Jiménez Losada
A global game is described by a real function on the set of partitions of the player set. Compared to a classic cooperative game with transferable utility, it does not specify what every coalition of players can obtain but rather what the whole society can obtain depending on what coalitions are formed. For instance, it can model carbon reduction agreements where the different coalitions represent the engagement that each country is willing to undertake, and the outcome represents the change in the mean global temperature at a given time.
The model of global games has many similarities with other cooperative games from a mathematical point of view. Even if it was introduced in 1991 it has hardly been studied to date. We build on previous research and propose new solutions to global games and study their properties. The final goal is to characterize the proposed solutions by means of properties.
Palabras clave: Cooperative games, Lattice, Shapley value
Programado
Teoría de Juegos
9 de junio de 2022 17:10
A14