F. Bernstein, G. Decroix, J. C. Gonçalves Dosantos
This paper considers a project consisting of multiple activities performed by independent players. Each player has control and discretion over the time required to complete the activity it is responsible for. Devoting a standard amount of resources to that activity would result in some base amount of time for completion. However, a player may divert some resources to outside projects in order to earn additional revenue leading to inexcusable delays in the activity under the player’s control. Such delays may or may not cause delays in the overall project completion time. If an overall project delay results, the project manager incurs a penalty based on the terms of the contract established with the customer. We study the allocation of project-level penalties (arising from inexcusable delays) among project activities, and examine how this allocation impacts the players’ decision making and the associated completion time of the project.
Keywords: Project Management, Game Theory, Shapley Value
Scheduled
GT02 Game Theory II. Game theory, communication and distribution
June 9, 2022 12:00 PM
A14